How does mead define self consciousness

In other words, vocal gestures allow us to speak to ourselves in the absence of other people. I create certain vocal gestures and expect how other people would respond to them, even in their absence. The responses of other individuals have been adopted and have developed into part of a readily accessible catalogue. Mead is of the opinion that Language is social from top to bottom and, therefore, there exists no private language as does Ludwig Wittgenstein believes.

Your order will be assigned to the most experienced writer in the relevant discipline. The highly demanded expert, one of our top writers with the highest rate among the customers. Social interaction is a vital notion for Mead and it affects self-consciousness.

The most interesting aspect of this idea is that at the human interactions levels we possess the capability of reflection. It also enables us to put in place conditions to encourage changes that we perceive and will bring certain transformation in us. In other words, new complications are bound to come up in the world, and due to our capacity for social interaction, we can derive some insight from others on the best courses of action to pursue to solve this problems as we look into the new problems facing us.

Certainly, because the difficulties are new means there are no immediate solutions to them. Actually, Mead associates moral development with our ability to move beyond old selves, old ideals for the purpose of integrating new ideals into our traits when new circumstances call for them. I accept. Log in Email. Log In. Forgot password? Search Your request should consist of 5 char min. Why choose us?

Limited time Offer. Stay Connected. Live Chat Order now. Society was conceived as a voluntary association of individuals; and the aim of this association was the preservation of natural rights to such goods as life, liberty, and property. Social authority, then, was derived from the individuals who had contracted to live together and to pursue certain human goals.

This analysis of society was at the root of the revolutionary social criticism of the eighteenth century. When men came to conceive the order of society as flowing from the rational character of society itself; when they came to criticize institutions from the point of view of their immediate function in preserving order, and criticized that order from the point of view of its purpose and function; when they approached the study of the state from the point of view of political science; then, of course, they found themselves in opposition to the medieval attitude which accepted its institutions as given by God to the church Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century The institutions of the medieval past e.

But the new regime contained reactionary elements of its own. The victorious bourgeoisie began to build a new class society based on the dialectic of capital and labor; and in this new society, the rights of man came to be conceived in terms of the successful struggle for economic power Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century The initial effects of the rise of capitalist society were disastrous for the working classes.

It was only after the subsequent rise of the trade union and socialist movements that the contradiction between ideology and reality began to be transcended. The ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity proved inadequate as bases for a fully rational society.

In the actual political world, where there is a conflict of wills, the concept of freedom falls into contradiction with itself. The freedom of one individual or group often infringes upon the freedom of another individual or group Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century According to Mead, any society is a complex organization of many individuals and groups.

These individuals and groups possess varying degrees of power and prestige. Given this situation, the concept of equality is at most an ideal to be pursued; but it is not a description of what goes on the in the concrete social world. He was caught between two worlds. He could not be sure of his identity. His sense of self was in crisis. The Romantic movement was an attempt to overcome this crisis by returning to and reconstructing the European past.

Romanticism, then, was an effort to reestablish the continuity between the past, present, and future of European culture.

The Romantic self, however, was not conceived of as transcendental. The Romantics agreed with Kant that the self is the basis of all knowledge and judgment. But while the Kantian self had been developed as a regulative concept in the attempt to render experience intelligible, the Romantic self was held to be actually constitutive of experience. That is what we insist upon. That is what gives the standard to values.

Thus, for the Romantics, knowledge of the self was not only possible, but was viewed as the highest form of knowledge. At the heart of the Romantic preoccupation with self-consciousness was the question of the relation between subject and object. It had even torn to pieces the philosophy of the Renaissance. The Romantics were reacting against this skeptical attitude.

They approached the problem of knowledge from the standpoint of the self. The self, for the Romantics, was the pre-condition of experience; and experience, therefore, including the experience of objects, was to be understood in relation to the self. The epistemological problem of Romantic philosophy was to assimilate the not-self to the self, to encompass the objective world within the subjective world, to make the universe- at-large an intimate part of self-consciousness.

We can be conscious of our consciousness. Self implies not-self; subject implies object. For every subject, there is an object; and for every object, there is a subject.

Romanticism, then, as Mead presents it, is not an extreme subjectivism. The world exists in relation to the self; but the world is objectively there as a necessary structure of human experience. Self and not-self, subject and object, are not contradictories, but dialectical polarities. Another aspect of Romantic self-consciousness is the view that the self is a dynamic process.

It involves an attitude of separation of the self from itself. Both subject and object are involved in the self in order that it may exist. The self must be identified, in some sense, with the not-self. It must be able to come back at itself from the outside. The process, then, as involved in the self is the subject-object process, a process within which both of these phases of experience lie, a process in which these different phases can be identified with each other — not necessarily as the same phase but at least as expressions of the same process Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century The upshot of this point of view, according to Mead, is an activist or pragmatic conception of mind and knowledge.

Knowing is a process involving the interaction of self and not-self. Knowledge is a result of a process in which the self takes action with reference to the not-self, in which the not-self is appropriated by the self. The interaction of self and not-self is the foundation, not only of our knowledge of the world, but also of our knowledge of the self.

Self-consciousness requires the objectification of the self. The Romantic elucidation of the polarity of self and not-self makes self-objectification and therefore self- consciousness theoretically comprehensible. In action toward the not-self, self-discovery becomes possible. Its meaning lies in the conduct of the individual; and when one has built up his world as such a field of action, then he realizes himself as the individual who carried out that action. That is the only way in which he can achieve a self.

One does not get at himself simply by turning upon himself the eye of introspection. The world is a field of action. In this field, there are tasks to be accomplished; and it is through the accomplishing of tasks, through the appropriation of the not-self by the self, that the self is enlarged and actualized. The fundamental condition of self-consciousness, as we have seen, is self- objectification. However, for Mead, the basic process of self-objectification takes place in interpersonal experience.

This is not the self- consciousness that goes with awkwardness and uneasiness. There is a close connection between historical consciousness and self- consciousness in Romantic thought. The Romantic movement arose out of the failure of the bourgeois revolution.

The hopes of the age of reason had not been realized, and the European was faced with a crisis in his sense of historical identity.

In reaction to a disappointing present, the Romantics looked back to the Middle Ages for a model of life that carried with it a certain security. But the bourgeois revolution, for all its failures, had created a new concept of the individual. Europe discovered the medieval period in the Romantic period.

In fact, it discovered itself first. Furthermore, it discovered the apparatus by means of which this self-discovery was possible. The self belongs to the reflexive mode. One senses the self only in so far as the self assumes the role of another so that it becomes both subject and object in the same experience.

This is the thing of great importance in this whole historical movement Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century The Romantic view of the Middle Ages, then, arose with reference to a problematic present and constituted an attempt on the part of European man to reconstruct the continuity of his experience.

This reconstruction of historical time — which is, as suggested above, a collective time — resulted in the creation of a new sense of collective identity. The Romantic conception of the medieval past developed as an effort to redefine the self.

European man had, in a sense, lost his self, and he turned to history in an attempt to recapture his sense of continuity. One has to grow into the attitude of the other, come back to the self, to realize the self. In placing oneself at the standpoint of others in the past, one can view oneself in a new light.

Here, Mead reveals still another form of experience — historical experience — in which the self might be objectified. It looked back at it and gave the past a new form as that out of which it had sprung.

It put itself back into the past. Romantic self- consciousness turned to the past, reconstructed the past, and made the past one of the main foundations of the self. Romantic self-consciousness was thereby expanded and deepened through historical consciousness. We might say that the Romantic movement reconstructed western self-consciousness through a reconstruction of western historical consciousness.

The bourgeois revolution had sundered the connection between the past and present of early 19th century Europe and had left the future in question. It was the task of the Romantic movement to redefine European self- consciousness by way of a reconstruction of the continuity of historical time.

In so doing, the Romantic movement revealed the present-directedness and future- directedness of historical consciousness and developed, by the way, an historically significant conception of the self as rooted in the experience of time. For Mead, experience is fundamentally processual and temporal. Experience is the undergoing of change. His concept of reality-as- process is ecological in structure and dynamic in content.

The relation between organism and environment percipient event and consentient set is mutual and dynamic. Both organism and environment are active: the activity of the organism alters the environment, and the activity of the environment alters the organism. There is no way of separating the two in reality, no way of telling which is primary and which secondary. The ontological principle of sociality is a fundamentally evolutionary concept that describes reality as a process in which percipient events adjust to new situations and adapt themselves to a variety of consentient sets.

Reflective intelligence is the peculiarly human way of overcoming the conflicts in experience; it is called into play when action is inhibited, and it has reference to a future situation in which the inhibition is overcome Mind, Self and Society And since, as we have seen, the reconstruction of the past is an important element in the temporal organization of human action, historical consciousness becomes a significant instrument in the human evolutionary process.

Historical thought redefines the present in terms of a reinterpreted and reconstructed past and thereby facilitates passage into the future. Human existence, then, is described by Mead in terms of evolution, temporality, and historicity. Human life involves a constant reconstruction of reality with reference to changing conditions and newly emergent situations.

This process of evolutionary reconstruction, according to Mead, is evident in institutional change. For Mead, the ideas of process and structure do not exclude each other, but are related dialectically in actual historical developments.

Historical consciousness is a way of comprehending change. But it is also a way of fostering change; that is, by comprehending the direction of historical change, one can place oneself within a given current of change and pursue the historical success of that current. In this way, the historically minded individual or group can contribute to the development of new structures within the process of time.

Conscious beings are those that are continually adjusting themselves, using their past experience, reconstructing their methods of conduct. The historical resort to the past has reference to new situations that emerge in a present and that suggest a future. Human thought, including historical consciousness, is a confrontation with novelty and is aimed at passing from a problematic present to a non-problematic future.

And the past is called in and reconstructed in relation to this project of coming to grips with the novelty of experience. Historical consciousness, as we have seen in the case of the Romantic movement, is instrumental in redefining and maintaining the temporal continuity of human experience.

Novelty, for Mead, is the foundation of consciousness, intelligence, and the freedom of conduct; it is the ground of human experience. The future is open, and in acting toward the future, man becomes an active agent in the formulation of his own existence. Although reality always exists in a present, the telos of this reality is to be found in the future.

It is the nature of intelligent conduct to be future-directed. Human-directedness-toward-the-future is the foundation of freedom. The mechanistic view of the world is inadequate as an account of freedom; in fact, mechanism, since it denies the possibility of final causes and attempts to explain everything in terms of efficient causes, must deny the possibility of freedom. Goals, unlike efficient causes, are selected by the organism; and our selection of goals is not explicable or predictable on the basis of efficient causes.

The essence of reality involves the future as essential to itself. Human action is action toward the future. The past does not determine although it does condition human conduct; it is, rather, human conduct that determines the past.

Human action takes place in a present that opens on the future, and it is in terms of the emergent present and impending future that the content and meaning of the past are determined. Human acts are teleological rather than mechanical.

Although Mead describes human existence as evolving toward an open future that cannot be prefigured with any finality, he does not ignore the fact that there are ideals that are operative in directing human action. Attempts to convert such ideals into realities have often met with frustration in the ironies of history.

It is for this reason that Mead argues that ideal ends, in some sense, must be grounded in historical reality; otherwise they become either fanciful wishes or mere ideological and rhetorical pronouncements. Of the many ideals that have influenced human conduct, Mead selects one for special consideration: the ideal of the universal community. The ideal of the universal community is, then, the ideal of history. The vision of the universal community is, in fact, the basis of the philosophy of history as a distinctive form of thought.

This is the eschatological vision that is at the root of the historical conceptions of St. Paul, St. In the life of the realities of political and social conflict e.

And yet, this ideal is, in a sense, an historical ideal; that is, the ideal of the universal community, although not explicit in history, is, according to Mead, implicit in the historical process. The ideal is, on the one hand, operative in the hopes of mankind, and, on the other hand, it is potentially present in certain concrete historical forces. Among these historical forces, Mead finds three of particular importance: 1 the universal religions; 2 universal economic processes; and 3 the process of communication.

Both economic processes and universal religions tend toward a universal community. Commerce and love are both potentially universalizing ideas, and both have been significant factors in the development of human societies. The forces of exchange and love know no boundaries; all men are included although abstractly in the community of exchange and love.

That is, the movement toward a universal community is an immanent process and not merely an abstract idea. Human history seems to imply a universal community. A third historical force that implies universality is the process of communication, to which Mead devotes so much of his attention in his various works.

Language, as we have seen, is the matrix of social coordination. A linguistic gesture is an action which implies a response from another and which is dependent for its meaning on that response. The process of communication is a way of gesturing toward others, a way of transcending oneself, a way of taking the role of another. The linguistic act both presupposes and implies a human community of unspecified and unlimited extension.

It is through significant communication that the individual is able to generalize her experience to include the experiences of others. The process of significant communication is the source of this universe of discourse.

This universalizing tendency of language comes closer to the realization of the ideal community than do the religious and economic attitudes. These latter, moreover, actually presuppose the communicational process: religion and economics organize themselves as social acts on the basis of communication. The human social ideal. Every person would be capable of putting herself into the place of every other person.

Such a system of perfect communication, in which the meanings of all symbols are fully transparent, would realize the ideal of a universal human community. Mead recognizes, of course, how far we are from realizing the universal community. Our religions, our economic systems, and our communicational processes are severely limited.

At present, these historical forces separate us as much as they unite us. All three, for example, are conditioned by another historical force which has a fragmenting rather than a universalizing effect on modern culture, namely, nationalism see Mead, Selected Writings This limitation is far from overcome in contemporary life.

Contemporary culture is a world culture; we all affect each other politically, culturally, economically. But it is also true that the ideal of the universal community is present by implication in our religions, in our economic systems, and in our communicational acts.

The ideal is there as a directive in human history. It implies an evolution toward an ideal goal and informs our conduct accordingly. And in so far as this ideal informs our actual conduct in the historical world, it is a concrete rather than an abstract universal The Philosophy of the Act The ideal of history is both transcendent and immanent; it is rooted in the past and present, but leads into the future which is always awaiting realization.

Historical thought, then, for Mead, is instrumental in the evolution of human society. It is through the constant reconstruction of experience that human intelligence and human society are expanded. There is implicit in human history a tendency toward a larger and larger sense of community. The ultimate formulation of this historical tendency is found in the ideal of the universal community. This ideal is not purely abstract that is, extra-historical , but is rooted in actual historical forces such as the universal religions, modern economic forces, and the human communicational process.

According to Mead, it is this ideal of the universal community that informs the human evolutionary process and that indicates the implicit direction or teleology of history. The following is a selection of books and articles that I have found especially helpful in my own work on Mead. George Cronk Email: gcronk bergen. Writings During his more-thanyear career, Mead thought deeply, wrote almost constantly, and published numerous articles and book reviews in philosophy and psychology.

Social Theory a. Communication and Mind In Mind, Self and Society , Mead describes how the individual mind and self arises out of the social process. Action For Mead, mind arises out of the social act of communication.

The following passage contains a remarkable piece of analysis: What goes on in the game goes on in the life of the child all the time. The Dialectic of Self and Other The self arises when the individual takes the attitude of the generalized other toward herself. The Temporal Structure of Human Existence The temporal structure of human existence, according to Mead, can be described in terms of the concepts of emergence , sociality , and freedom.

Emergence and Temporality What is the ground of the temporality of human experience? The Function of the Past in Human Experience The emergent event is not only a problem for ongoing activity: it also constitutes a problem for rationality.

Distance Experience For Mead, perceptual objects arise within the act and are instrumental in the consummation of the act.

Galileo articulated the latter distinction as follows: I feel myself impelled by the necessity, as soon as I conceive a piece of matter or corporeal substance, of conceiving that in its own nature it is bounded and figured in such and such a figure, that in relation to others it is either large or small, that it is in this or that place, in this or that time, that it is in motion or remains at rest.

The Scientific Object Mead distinguishes two main types of perspective: 1 the perceptual perspective and 2 the reflective perspective. Philosophy of History a. The Nature of History History, according to Mead, is the collective time of the social act. History and Self-Consciousness In Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century , Mead offers the Romantic movement of the late 18th and 19th centuries as an example of the present and future orientation of human inquiries into the past.

The Revolt of Reason Against Authority The idea of rationality has played a central role in modern social theory. History and Romantic Self-Consciousness There is a close connection between historical consciousness and self- consciousness in Romantic thought.

Thus, Europe discovered the medieval period in the Romantic period. The Ideal of History Although Mead describes human existence as evolving toward an open future that cannot be prefigured with any finality, he does not ignore the fact that there are ideals that are operative in directing human action. Mead thus states the ideal of history in primarily communicational terms: The human social ideal. References and Further Reading a. Morris et al. University of Chicago The Philosophy of the Present, ed.

Murphy Open Court Selected Writings, ed. III : Coss Henry Holt : Miller, Review of Metaphysics , 17 : Dewey et al. Holt : Books Aboulafia, Mitchell. Aboulafia, Mitchell ed. Baldwin, John D.

Cook, Gary A. Corti, Walter Robert ed. Mead Amriswiler Bucherei [Switzerland] Goff, Thomas. Hamilton, Peter. Hanson, Karen. Joas, Hans. Pragmatism and Social Theory University of Chicago Miller, David L. Self, Language, and the World University of Chicago Morris, Charles. Signs, Language, and Behavior Prentice-Hall Natanson, Maurice. The Social Dynamics of George H. Mead Public Affairs Press Pfeutze, Paul E. Rosenthal, Sandra. Rucker, Darnell. Mead would attend Oberlin College from —, and matriculate at Harvard from — At Harvard he studied with Josiah Royce, a philosopher deeply indebted to G.

Hegel, who also left a lasting impression on Mead. Mead met William James at Harvard, although he did not study with him. Almost immediately after graduation, Mead resided in William James's summer home tutoring his son Harry.

Mead's mother, Elizabeth Storrs Billings, was a devoutly religious woman, who taught at Oberlin for two years after the death of her husband in , and served as president of Mount Holyoke College from — After his college years, Mead became a committed naturalist and non-believer, but he had struggled for years with the religious convictions that he had inherited from his family and community.

For a period of time after college he even considered Christian Social Work as a career, but he explained in a letter to his friend Henry Castle why this career path would be problematic. Mead did indeed move away from his earlier religious roots, but the activist spirit remained with him.

Mead marched in support of women's suffrage, served as a treasurer for the Settlement House movement, immersed himself in civic matters in Chicago, and generally supported progressive causes. Jane Addams was a close friend. In terms of his transformation into a naturalist, no doubt Darwin played a significant role. As a matter of fact, one can understand much of Mead's work as an attempt to synthesize Darwin, Hegel, Dewey's functionalist turn in psychology, and insights gleaned from James.

Mead taught with Dewey at the University of Michigan from —, and when Dewey was made chair at the University of Chicago in , he requested that Mead receive an appointment.

Mead spent the rest of his career at Chicago. But before he began teaching at Michigan, Mead was directly exposed to major currents of European thought when he studied in Germany from —, taking a course from Wilhelm Dilthey and immersing himself in Wilhelm Wundt's research. Dewey and Mead were not only very close friends, they shared similar intellectual trajectories. Both went through a period in which Hegel was the most significant philosophical figure for them, and both democratized and de-essentialized Hegelian ideas about the self and community.

Nevertheless, neo-hegelian organic metaphors and notions of negation and conflict, reinterpreted as the problematic situation, remain central to their positions. The teleological also remains important in their thought, but it is reduced in scale from the world historical and localized in terms of anticipatory experiences and goal oriented activities.

For Mead, the development of the self is intimately tied to the development of language. To demonstrate this connection, Mead begins by articulating what he learned about the gesture from Wundt. Gestures are to be understood in terms of the behavioral responses of animals to stimuli from other organisms. For example, a dog barks, and a second dog either barks back or runs away. How does this capacity arise? It does so through the vocal gesture. A vocal gesture can be thought of as a word or phrase.

When a vocal gesture is used the individual making the gesture responds implicitly in the same manner as the individual hearing it. But, of course, I don't hear them exactly as you do, because I am aware of directing them to you. As noted, Mead was indebted to Hegel's work, and the notion of reflexivity plays a fundamental role in Mead's theory of mind. Vocal gestures—which depend on sufficiently sophisticated nervous systems to process them—allow individuals to hear their own gestures in the way that others hear them.

Or, to put this in other terms, vocal gestures allow one to speak to oneself when others are not present. I make certain vocal gestures and anticipate how they would be responded to by others, even when they are not present. The responses of others have been internalized and have become part of an accessible repertoire.

Mead would agree with Ludwig Wittgenstein that there are no private languages. Language is social all the way down. Mentality on our approach simply comes in when the organism is able to point out meanings to others and to himself. This is the point at which mind appears, or if you like, emerges…. It is absurd to look at the mind simply from the standpoint of the individual human organism; for, although it has its focus there, it is essentially a social phenomenon; even its biological functions are primarily social.

MSS, — It is by means of reflexiveness—the turning back of the experience of the individual upon himself—that the whole social process is thus brought into the experience of the individuals involved in it; it is by such means, which enable the individual to take the attitude of the other toward himself, that the individual is able consciously to adjust himself to that process, and to modify the resultant of that process in any given social act in terms of his adjustment to it.

Reflexiveness, then, is the essential condition, within the social process, for the development of mind. MSS, Mind is developed not only through the use of vocal gestures, but through the taking of roles, which will be addressed below.

Here it is worth noting that although we often employ our capacity for reflexivity to engage in reflection or deliberation, both Dewey and Mead argue that habitual, non-deliberative, experience constitutes the most common way that we engage the world. The habitual involves a host of background beliefs and assumptions that are not raised to the level of self conscious reflection unless problems occur that warrant addressing.

One of the most noteworthy features of Mead's account of the significant symbol is that it assumes that anticipatory experiences are fundamental to the development of language.

We have the ability place ourselves in the positions of others—that is, to anticipate their responses—with regard to our linguistic gestures. This ability is also crucial for the development of the self and self-consciousness. For Mead, as for Hegel, the self is fundamentally social and cognitive.

It should be distinguished from the individual, who also has non-cognitive attributes. The self, then, is not identical to the individual and is linked to self-consciousness. It begins to develop when individuals interact with others and play roles. What are roles? They are constellations of behaviors that are responses to sets of behaviors of other human beings.

The notions of role-taking and role playing are familiar from sociological and social-psychological literature. For example, the child plays at being a doctor by having another child play at being a patient. To play at being a doctor, however, requires being able to anticipate what a patient might say, and vice versa. Role playing involves taking the attitudes or perspectives of others.

It is worth noting in this context that while Mead studied physiological psychology, his work on role-taking can be viewed as combining features of the work of the Scottish sympathy theorists which James appealed to in The Principles of Psychology , with Hegel's dialectic of self and other.

As we will discover shortly, perspective-taking is associated not only with roles, but with far more complex behaviors. For Mead, if we were simply to take the roles of others, we would never develop selves or self-consciousness. We would have a nascent form of self-consciousness that parallels the sort of reflexive awareness that is required for the use of significant symbols.

A role-taking self consciousness of this sort makes possible what might be called a proto-self, but not a self, because it doesn't have the complexity necessary to give rise to a self. How then does a self arise? Here Mead introduces his well-known neologism, the generalized other. When children or adults take roles, they can be said to be playing these roles in dyads.

However, this sort of exchange is quite different from the more complex sets of behaviors that are required to participate in games.

In the latter, we are required to learn not only the responses of specific others, but behaviors associated with every position on the field. For Mead, although these communities can take different forms, they should be thought of as systems; for example, a family can be thought of systemically and can therefore give rise to a generalized other and a self that corresponds to it.

Generalized others can also be found in. In his Principles of Psychology , a book Mead knew well, William James discusses various types of empirical selves, namely, the material, the social, and the spiritual. In addressing the social self, James notes how it is possible to have multiple selves. From Mead's vantage point, James was on the right track. However, the notion of audience is left undeveloped in James, as is the manner in which language is utilized in the genesis of the self and self-consciousness.

For Mead, James's audiences should be thought of in terms of systemically organized groups, such as we find in certain games, which give rise to generalized others. Mead relates the latter capacity to cosmopolitan political and cultural orientations. It's worth noting that for Mead a full account of the self should address the phylogenetic as well as the ontogenetic.

His target, in part, is no less than the idea of the transcendental ego, especially in its Kantian incarnation. When we act in habitual ways we are not typically self-conscious. We are engaged in actions at a non-reflective level. In this situation, one views oneself from the perspective of the various sets of behaviors that constitute the family system. This self, however, doesn't tell us how any particular play may be made.

When a ball is grounded to a second baseman, how he or she reacts is not predetermined. He reacts, and how he reacts is always to some degree different from how he has reacted in the past. Its responses may differ only in small ways from previous responses, making them functionally equivalent, but they will never be exactly the same.